




MOSAICS

More Situational Awareness for Industrial Control Systems (MOSAICS)



Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)



The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program addresses joint and combatant command warfighting needs through the execution and demonstration of prototypes within two to four years. The program delivers developmental and operational prototypes to affordably operationalize technologies that enable warfighters to explore novel concepts and to facilitate informed transition to formal acquisition programs.



Problem

- **U.S. critical infrastructure is at risk**

Extensive dependency on highly vulnerable information technology and industrial control systems equals unacceptable and growing risk

- **The threat is pervasive**

Virtually any actor with substantial resources can now develop or buy the capability to attack elements of U.S. critical infrastructure with cyber weapons

- **DoD is not postured to stop most dangerous attacks**

The offensive cyber capabilities of our most capable potential adversaries are likely to far exceed our ability to defend

Defense Science Board 2017



Threat Capability Description

Criminal or state actors who are organized, highly technical, proficient, well-funded professionals working in teams to discover new vulnerabilities and develop exploits. KEY POINT - Finds and exploits unknown vulnerabilities.

Defense Science Board – Cyber Threat Tier IV Adversary

| Capability | Description |
|----------------|---|
| Target | Highly capable of determining and understanding the technology, people, and processes of the target facility |
| Access | Demonstrate a capability for limited gap jumping, as well as the ability to effectively traverse the IT/OT boundary |
| Payload | Demonstrated capability to conduct ICS/SCADA attacks against a variety of targets |



Solution: MOSAICS

What is it?

- MOSAICS is a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration funded by the OUSD (R&E) - Emerging Capability and Prototyping
- MOSAICS is an integration of COTS and GOTS technologies for enhanced situational awareness and defense of industrial control systems associated with task critical assets

What will it deliver?

- Integrated, operational capability to enable defense of control systems
- ICS baselining tools and programmable logic controller sensors
- Tailored visualizations, analytics, automated cybersecurity orchestration



Anticipated Benefits

- Enhance understanding of risk to critical infrastructure and supported operational capabilities
- Detect control system threats faster – from months to minutes
- Improve situational awareness driving real-time decisions aids to enable cyber defender response
- Disrupt adversary kill-chain in mission-relevant time
- Limit adversary re-use of attacks through enhanced sharing of indicators and mitigations



Stakeholders



U.S. AIR FORCE




Hawaiian Electric
Maui Electric
Hawai'i Electric Light



OV-1

ICS Protection

Facilities Engineer



Cyber Defender



Industrial Control Systems (ICS)



Joint Warfighter Operations



Operational Cyber Defense Capabilities



Mission Assurance



Water



Electric Grid



Fuel




Building /Plant

Protect Critical Infrastructure Control Systems from Cyber Attacks




CONOPS





Systems Engineering Approach





Test Concept

CRAWL-WALK-RUN PROGRESSION OF COMPLEXITY

Utility Assessment

**NAVFAC SW
Electrical OASyS SCADA
OPERATIONAL DEMO**

- Real-world employment of the fielded prototype in San Diego, CA
- Assess in operational environment under mission conditions with operational users
- IAW CONOPS and TTP
- ICW USPACOM exercise

Field Test 2

**NAVFAC EXWC
HW-IN-THE-LOOP**

- On state-of-the-art SCADA testbed at Port Hueneme, CA
- Simulated ops environment
- ICW Trident Warrior

Field Test 1

**JOINT BASE
SAN ANTONIO DEMO**

- Combined live network and cyber range test
- Assess most mature capabilities in a realistic environment

COTS BEST OF BREED TECHNOLOGIES & GOTS GAP FILLERS

RIGOROUS ASSESSMENT WITH REPRESENTATIVE ENVIRONMENTS AND THREATS



Operational Requirements

- Protect task critical assets from disruptive cyber attacks
- Enhance intrusion detection
- Automate *Advanced Cyber Industrial Control Systems TTP*
- Provide robust analytics and decision support
- Deliver actionable situational awareness and enterprise info sharing



Functional Requirements



| F1.0 Identify System Components | F2.0 Protect from Threats | F3.0 Monitor / Detect threats | F4.0 Analyze detected events | F5.0 Visualize status | F6.0 Decide on COA | F7.0 Perform mitigation actions | F8.0 Perform recovery actions | F9.0 Share data |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|
| F1.1.1 Inventory physical devices | F2.1.1 Protect data at-rest | F3.1 Monitor facility status | F4.1 Profile networks and systems | F5.1 Collect system status | F6.1 Generate available COA | F7.1 Select mitigation technique | F8.1 Determine desired end state for recovery | F9.1 Select data to share |
| F1.1.2 Inventory software components | F2.1.2 Protect data in-transit | F3.2 Monitor critical infrastructure status | F4.2 Compare against normal behaviors | F5.2.1 Display top-level view of facility capability | F6.2 Determine automated COAs | F7.2 Select equipment / node to apply mitigation | F8.2 Determine recovery timeframe | F9.2 Collect data |
| F1.1.3 Map communication and data flows | F2.2 Manage facility ICS assets | F.3.3.1 Detect changes from baseline configuration | F4.3.1 Perform system analysis | F5.2.2 Display affected network elements | F6.3 Display COA to user | F7.3.1 Protect / harden | F8.3 Consider list of recovery COA | F9.3 Receive data from external sources |
| F1.2 Categorize system components based on criticality and vulnerability | F2.3 Establish operational availability goals for ICS data capacity | F.3.3.2 Monitor system components | F4.3.2 Perform malware analysis | F5.2.3 Display affected devices | F6.4 Consider facility priorities | F7.3.2 Diversify | F8.4 Select recovery COA | F9.4 Store data |
| F1.3.1 Manage credential access | F2.4 Protect against ICS data leaks | F.3.3.3 Detect malware | F4.3.3 Perform network analysis | F5.4 Display identity of event | F6.5 Consider threat severity | F7.3.3 Segment | F8.5 Preserve data for forensic analysis | F9.5 Set access permissions |
| F1.3.2 Manage physical access | F2.5 Protect communications and control networks | F.3.3.4 Detect anomalous behavior | F4.4 Categorize event | F5.5.1 Display functional impact | F6.6 Consider CI availability | F7.3.4 Stop | F8.5.1 Restart | F9.6 Verify identify / access from requester |
| F1.3.3 Manage remote access | F2.6 Perform integrity checks for software, hardware, firmware information integrity | F.3.3.5 Detect rule/policy violations | F4.5 Perform event correlation | F5.5.2 Display information impact | F6.7 Consider mission priorities | F7.3.5 Restart | F8.5.2 Reinitialize | F9.7 Enable / deny access to data |
| F1.3.4 Manage access and authorization | F2.7.1 Develop a system baseline | F3.4.1 Monitor state of physical barriers | F4.6 Record events | F5.6 Receive operator acknowledgement | | F7.3.6 Switch to manual control | F8.5.3 Reset permissions / access | F9.8 Send data |
| F1.3.5 Manage network integrity | F2.7.2 Maintain system baseline | | | | | F7.4 Observe system reaction to mitigation actions | F8.5.4 Replace | |
| F1.4 Utilize identity credentials in facility operations | F2.7.3 Implement a configuration control process to update system inventory | | | | | | F8.5.5 Reconnect | |
| F1.5 Authenticate components | F2.8 Test recovery and protection systems and plans | | | | | | F8.5.6 Test operation of system component | |
| | F2.9 Maintain ICS protection / monitoring systems | | | | | | F8.7 Observe recovery progress | |
| | F2.10 Perform routine maintenance on ICS components (local or remote) | | | | | | | |
| | F2.11 Maintain audit logs for ICS protection / monitoring systems | | | | | | | |
| | F2.12 Protect against cyber threats | | | | | | | |



Identify System Components

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Inventory key system devices and components to support the facility's mission and categorize based on criticality and results of vulnerability assessment and identify internal external data flows and connections.

Key tasks:

- Inventory physical devices
- Inventory software components
- Map communication flows
- Map data flows
- Categorize system components based on criticality and vulnerability
- Establish priorities



Protect from Threats

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Implement controls to limit access to physical and logical assets to authorized users, processes and devices and protect data-in-transit and data-at-rest

Key tasks:

- Manage identities and credentials
- Protect data at rest and in transition
- Manage facility ICS assets
- Protect against ICS data leaks
- Protect communications and control networks
- Perform integrity checks for software, hardware, firmware information integrity
- Maintain ICS protection systems
- Maintain audit logs for ICS protection/ monitoring systems
- Protect against cyber threats



Monitor / Detect Threats

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Monitor system components for indications of an adversarial presence such as malicious activity and anomalies including evidence of malicious code and unauthorized personnel, connections, devices and software and monitor system components for unauthorized changes from baseline configurations

Key tasks:

- Monitor critical infrastructure status
- Detect changes from baseline configuration
- Monitor system components
- Detect malware
- Detect anomalous behavior
- Detect rule / policy violations
- Generate events



Analyze Detected Events

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Examine anomalous or malicious activity to determine if there is a threat to the system and evaluated the severity and type of detected threat

Key tasks:

- Profile networks and systems
- Compare against normal behavior
- Perform system analysis
- Perform malware analysis
- Perform network analysis
- Categorize events
- Perform event correlation
- Record events



Visualize Status

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Provide visibility of the operational state of the system and of malicious and anomalous activity to the system operator and create logs and reports of malicious and anomalous activity

Key tasks:

- Collect system status
- Display top-level view of facility capability
- Display affected network elements
- Display affected devices
- Display identity of event
- Display functional impact
- Display information impact
- Receive operator acknowledgement



Decide on COA

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Evaluate events and determine manual and automated courses of action that minimize risk while considering the mission impact of the various COAs

Key tasks:

- Generate available COAs
- Determine automated COAs
- Display COAs to user
- Consider facility priorities
- Consider threat severity
- Consider CI availability
- Consider mission priorities



Perform Mitigation Actions

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Execute the courses of actions needed to eliminate or minimize any deleterious effects resulting from malicious activity, anomalies and threats

Key tasks:

- Select mitigation technique
- Select equipment / node to apply mitigation
- Protect / Diversify / Segment / Stop / Restart / Switch to manual control
- Observe system reaction to mitigation actions



Perform Recovery Actions

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share

Perform the activities needed to restore the system to a fully mission-capable state

Key tasks:

- Determine desired end state for recovery
- Determine recovery timeframe
- Consider list of recovery COAs
- Select recovery COAs
- Preserve data for forensic analysis
- Restart / Reinitialize / Reset access / Replace / Reconnect
- Test operation of system component
- Observe recover progress



Share Data

Identify

Protect

Detect

Analyze

Visualize

Decide

Mitigate

Recover

Share


Collect the lessons learned, incident data, and evidence in order to coordinate with other organizations to strengthen the ability to effectively respond to cyber threats

Key tasks:

- Select data to share
- Receive data from external sources
- Receive request for sharing
- Collect data
- Store data
- Set access permissions
- Enable / deny access to data
- Send data



Schedule



JCTD Start

Baseline Tool Spinoff

MUA



Transition



Anticipated Deliverables

Phase 1

- CONOPS
- ICS network baselining tool

Phase 2

- ACI TTP automation
- ICS sensors

Phase 3

- Field prototype
- Military Utility Assessment
- Industry Day
- Training plans
- Transition plan
- Unified Facilities Criteria updates
- Final reports

Transition Paths

DOD

- Air Force – AFCEC
- Army – IMCOM
- Marine Corps – MARFORCYBER
- Navy – NAVFAC
- USCYBERCOM
- Defense Technical Information Center


Commercial partners

Federal sector and utilities

Standards and regulatory organizations



Automation Proof of Concept



- NSA-sponsored
- Apply IACD to ICS/SCADA
- Demonstrate capability early in program
- Prove ability to automate sections of the ACI TTP
- Capture lessons learned for application to MOSAICS



What We Need From Industry

- **Vendors**
 - Link with MOSAICS' systems engineering team
 - Identify capabilities that might address requirements
 - Provide insight into those capabilities
- **Providers**
 - Provide inputs on best practices in the field
 - Share MOSAICS progress and results
 - Lessons learned
 - Automated playbooks
 - Reference architecture



Points of Contact

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